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Abstract
We revisit Fujiwaras (2008) di¤erential duopoly game to show that
the degenerate nonlinear feedback identied by the tangency point
with the stationary state line is indeed unstable, given the dynamics
of the natural resource exploited by rms. To do so, we fully charac-
terise the continuum of nonlinear feedback solution via Rowats (2007)
method, characterising the innitely many stable nonlinear feedback
equilibria.
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1 Introduction
We revisit Fujiwaras (2008) model of dynamic duopolistic exploitation of
a renewable resource. In his note, Fujiwara characterises, amongst other
features, the nonlinear feedback solution at the tangency point between the
steady state locus of the natural resource and the map of rms isoclines.
In doing so, Fujiwara (2008, p. 219) states the following: Rowat (2007,
pp. 31933194) gives useful conditions for [the nonlinear feedback control]
to be an equilibrium strategy. At rst sight, they are violated in the present
model but such a guess is incorrect since Rowat (2007) assumes that player
is payo¤ does not depend on its rivals strategy.
The purpose of our rejoinder is (i) to show that the tangency solution
is indeed unstable due to the dynamic properties of the model, and (ii) to
characterise the continuum of stable nonlinear feedback equilibria identied
by the appropriate intersections between isoclines and the steady state locus.
Each of the equilibria belonging to this set can be reached provided that the
initial stock of the resource is low enough. To this aim, we strictly follow
Rowats (2007) procedure.1
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 illustrates
the setup. The linear feedback solution is illustrated in section 3. Nonlinear
feedback strategies are dealt with in section 4. Concluding remarks are in
section 5.
1Rowat (2007) uses a model where players have quadratic loss functions which are
additively separable w.r.t. playerscontrols. This has the consequence that instantaneous
best replies in the control space are orthogonal to each other, which is the source of
Fujiwaras observation. However, this feature is altogether unrelated to the stability issue,
as the ensuing analysis is about to illustrate.
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2 The model
The setup is the same as in Benchekroun (2003), Fujiwara (2008) and Colombo
and Labrecciosa (2015). The model illustrates a di¤erential oligopoly game
of resource extraction unravelling over continuous time t 2 [0;1) : The mar-
ket is supplied by two fully symmetric rms2 producing a homogeneous
good, whose inverse demand function is p = a   X at any time t, with
X =
P2
i=1 xi. Firms share the same technology, characterised by marginal
cost c 2 (0; a) ; constant over time. The individual instantaneous prot func-
tion is i = (p  c)xi. Firms exploit a common pool renewable resource,
whose evolution over time is described by the following dynamics:

S = F (S) X (1)
with
F (S) =
8>>><>>>:
kS 8S 2 (0; Sy]
kSy

Smax   S
Smax   Sy

8S 2 (Sy; Smax]
(2)
where S is the resource stock, k > 0 is its implicit growth rate when the
stock is at most equal to Sy and kSy is the maximum sustainable yield.
Taken together, (1-2) imply that (i) if the resource stock is su¢ ciently small
the population grows at an exponential rate; and (ii) beyond Sy, the asset
grows at a decreasing rate. Moreover, Smax is the carrying capacity of the
habitat, beyond which the growth rate of the resource is negative, being
limited by available amounts of food and space. In the remainder, we will
conne our attention to the case in which F (S) = kS, as in Fujiwara (2008).
Firms play noncooperatively and choose their respective outputs simul-
taneously at every instant. In the remainder, in order to save upon notation,
2The analysis of oligopolistic interaction in the same setup is in Benchekroun (2008)
and Lambertini and Mantovani (2014).
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we will pose   a   c > 0. The i-th rm maximises the discounted prot
ow
i =
Z 1
0
ie
 rtdt =
Z 1
0
(   xi   xj)xje rtdt; (3)
under the constraint posed by the state equation

S = kS  X (4)
The initial condition is S (0) = S0 > 0. Parameter r > 0 is the discount
rate, common to all managers and constant over time. To guarantee the
positivity of the residual resource stock at the steady state under linear feed-
back strategies, the ensuing analysis will be carried out under the following
assumption (cf. Fujiwara, 2008, p. 218):
Assumption 1 k > 5r=2:
If rms dont internalise the consequences of their behaviour at any time
and play the individual (static) Cournot-Nash output xCN = =3 at all
times, then the residual amount of the natural resource in steady state is
SCN = 2= (3k) = XCN=k: As the ensuing analysis illustrates, the static
solution indeed corresponds to the open-loop one, which is unstable.
3 The linear feedback solution
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) of rm i is
rVi (S) = max
xi
[(  X)xi + V 0i (S) (kS  X)] (5)
where Vi (S) is rm is value function, and V 0i (S) = @Vi (S) =@S: The rst
order condition (FOC) on xi is
   2xi   xj   V 0i (S) = 0 (6)
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In view of the ex ante symmetry across rms, we impose the symmetry
conditions xi = x (S) and Vi (S) = V (S) for all i and solve FOC (6) to obtain
xF (S) = max

0;
   V 0 (S)
3

(7)
where superscript F stands for feedback. Consider the case where   
V 0 (S) > 0. Substituting xF (S) = (   V 0 (S)) =3 into (5), the latter can
be rewritten as follows:
 [5V 0 (S)  ] + 9 [rV (S)  kSV 0 (S)]  4V 0 (S)2
9
= 0 (8)
Then, we may pose V (S) = 1S2+ 2S+ 3, so that V 0 (S) = 21S+ 2: From
(8) we obtain the following system of Riccati equations:
1 [9 (r   2k)  161] = 0 (9)
101 + 2 [9 (r   k)  161] = 0 (10)
93r + 2 [5   42]  2 = 0 (11)
Equations (10-11) are solved by
3 =
2   2 [5   42]
9r
2 =
93r
9 (k   r) + 161
(12)
while the roots of (9) are
11 = 0; 12 =
9 (r   2k)
16
(13)
whereby, if 1 = 11; the individual equilibrium output is xF1 (S) = xCN =
xOL; i.e., the open-loop production level,3 while if 1 = 12; the individual
equilibrium output is
xF2 (S) =
 (5r   2k) + 9 (2k   r) kS
24k
(14)
3That is, here the open-loop solution is a degenerate feedback one. For more on games
with this feature, see Fershtman (1987), Mehlmann (1988, ch. 4), Dockner et al. (2000,
ch. 7) and Cellini et al. (2005), inter alia.
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If x = xF2 (S) ; the steady state level of the natural resource stock is
SF2 =
 (2k   5r)
3k (2k   3r) > 0 (15)
for all values of k satisfying Assumption 1. In the remainder, we dene
SF2  SLF and xF2  SLF  = xLF .
4 Nonlinear feedback equilibria
To characterise the continuum of nonlinear feedback solutions, we adopt the
same procedure as in Rowat (2007),4 again conning to symmetric equilibria.
Imposing the symmetry condition xi = x (S) for all i and solving (6), we
obtain V 0(S) =    3x (S) : Substituting this into (5), di¤erentiating both
sides with respect to S and rearranging, any feedback strategy is implicitly
identied by
x0(S) =
(k   r) [   3x (S)]
 + 3kS   8x (S) ; (16)
which must hold together with the terminal condition lim t!1e rtV (s) = 0.
From (16) we see that
x0(S) = 0, x0 (S) = 
3
= xF1 (S) = xOL (17)
x0(S)! 1, x1 (S) =  + 3kS
8
(18)
Since the feedback control xF (S) is (7), the HJB equation is rV (S)  
kSV 0(S) = 0 for all  2 (0; V 0 (S)]. In such a case, V (S) = Sr=kC, pro-
vided C > kS
k r
k =r: Otherwise, the HJB equation is (8), whereby
rV (S) =
4V 0 (S)2 + 2 + V 0(S) (9kS   5)
9
(19)
4Nonlinear feedback solutions have been investigated in oligopoly theory, environmental
and resource economics and other elds. See Tsutsui and Mino (1990), Shimomura (1991),
Dockner and Sorger (1996), Itaya and Shimomura (2001), Rubio and Casino (2002) and
Colombo and Labrecciosa (2015), inter alia.
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(19) can be di¤erentiated w.r.t. S on both sides, to obtain
w0 (S) =
9 (k   r)w (S)
5 (   kS)  4w (S) (20)
where w (S)  V 0(S) and  6= [5kS + 4w (S)] =5. Equation (20) can be
usefully rewritten through a transformation of variables using w = { + A
and S =  +B; with A = 0 and B = 5= (9k) ; into
d{
d 
=
5 (r   k){
9k + 8{
(21)
which, dening z  {= ; whereby { =  z and @{=@ = z +   @z=@ ;
rewrites as
z +  
@z
@ 
=
5 (r   k) z
9k + 8z
(22)
This has two constant solutions, za = 0 and zb = 9 (r   2k) =8. Going back
to the original control variables, we have
xa =
   A  za (S  B)
3
; xb =
   A  zb (S  B)
3
(23)
where A and B are known. The levels of S solving

S = 0 at x = xa and
x = xb are, respectively,
Sa =
2
3k
; Sb =
5
3k
(24)
with Sb < B since k > 5r=2 > 3r=2. Then, for z 6= fza; zbg ; one can solve
d 
 
=
[9k=8 + z] dz
(z   za) (z   zb) =
adz
(z   za) +
bdz
(z   zb) (25)
where coe¢ cients a = k= (2k   r) and b = (k   r) = (2k   r) are univocally
determined through the method of partial fractions. Integrating (25), we
get ln j j = fM + a ln jz   zaj + b ln jz   zbj, where fM is an integration
constant. Exponentiation yields j j = (jz   zaja jz   zbjb) =M , withM =
e fM andM can be rewritten in terms of w (S) and S as follows:
M = [w (S)  A  Sa (S  B)]a  [w (S)  A  Sb (S  B)]b : (26)
7
Figure 1 Linear and nonlinear feedback solutions in the state-control space
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Changing the arbitrary value of M generates innitely many nonlinear
solutions. Figure 1 describes the evolution of the single state and the n
symmetric controls over time, allowing us to grasp the features of any non-
linear feedback solutions, including that generated by the tangency point
with the locus

S = 0 (point T in the gure). Loci x0(S) = 0 (along which
x0 (S) = x
F1 (S) = xOL) and x0(S) ! 1 are also drawn. The arrows along
the curve tangent to the locus

S = 0 in point T show that the tangency
solution is indeed unstable. Nevertheless, there are innitely many solutions
identied by the intersections along the segment delimited by points LF and
T , which can be reached provided that the initial stock is su¢ ciently low
to allow rms to locate themselves along a stable trajectory towards one of
these points (see Itaya and Shimomura, 2001; Rubio and Casino, 2002). The
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length of LFT is
LFT =
q
(ST   SLF )2 + (xT   xLF )2 (27)
where SLF = SF2; ST = nxT=k and xLF = xF2 at S = SLF .
The foregoing analysis proves the following:
Proposition 1 For each x 2 xLF ; xT  ; there exists a unique S 2 SLF ; ST 
solving

S = 0: If S0 2
 
0; ST

; each of these pairs identies a stable feed-
back solution of the game. The pair
 
SLF ; xLF

is the unique linear feedback
solution, while the innitely many others are nonlinear.
5 Concluding remarks
We have used the same approach as in Rowat (2007) to identify the contin-
uum of nonlinear feedback equilibria arising in a game of duopolistic exploita-
tion of a renewable resource initially investigated by Benchekroun (2003) and
Fujiwara (2008). In doing so, we have also shown that the degenerate non-
linear tangency solution is indeed unstable.
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